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Abstract
We consider bargaining games under the assumption that bargainers
are loss averse, i.e. experience disutility from obtaining an outcome lower
than some reference point. We follow the approach of Shalev (2002) by
imposing the self-supporting condition on a solution. Given a bargaining
game, we say outcome z is self-supporting under a given bargaining solu-
tion, whenever transforming the game using outcome z as reference point,
yields a transformed game in which the solution is z.
We show that n-player bargaining games have a unique self-supporting
outcome under the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution. We deﬁne a bar-
gaining solution, giving exactly this outcome, and characterize it by the
standard axioms of Scale Invariance [SI], Individual Monotonicity [IM],
and Strong Individual Rationality [SIR], and a novel axiom called Propor-
tional Concession Invariance [PCI]. A bargaining solution satisﬁes PCI
if moving the utopia point in the direction of the solution outcome, does
not change this outcome.
1 Introduction
In his seminal paper, Nash (1950) deﬁned the ‘bargaining problem’ as a proxy for
real life bargaining situations. His model is described by two players attempting
to ﬁnd agreement on a certain feasible outcome. They are motivated by the
fact that failure to cooperate results in an unfavorable outcome for all. Nash
himself deﬁned and characterized a solution for this problem, the well known
Nash bargaining solution. A wide range of other solutions have been formulated
since. One of the most prominent alternatives to the Nash bargaining solution
is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, deﬁned by Raiﬀa (1953) and characterized
by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975).
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In economics – and bargaining is no exception – risk attitudes tend to play
a pervasive role on how agents behave. In the bargaining literature, much at-
tention has been paid to the inﬂuence of risk attitudes, and in particular risk
aversion, on the outcomes players ﬁnally agree on according to certain bargain-
ing solutions. Several studies, among which Kannai (1977), Kihlstrom, Roth,
and Schmeidler (1981), and Roth (1985), ﬁnd that the Nash bargaining so-
lution favors the less risk averse bargainer. Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler
(1981) ﬁnd similar results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Ko¨bberling and
Peters (2003) also study the eﬀect of risk aversion on the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution, but distinguish between probabilistic risk aversion and utility risk aver-
sion. They ﬁnd it is an advantage to have a more utility risk averse opponent,
or a less probabilistically risk averse opponent.
In the present article we investigate the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution under
a related behavioral phenomenon, called loss aversion. Loss aversion was intro-
duced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984). It is based on the premise that
economic agents derive utility from changes in wealth in comparison to some
reference point, and that changes for the worse – i.e. losses – carry more weight
than equivalent changes for the better.
To introduce this concept in the bargaining problem, we follow the approach
of Shalev (2002). Each bargainer’s preference is represented by a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function, a nonnegative loss aversion coeﬃcient, and a ref-
erence point ; if a player’s utility level is below his reference point, then he
experiences a disutility equal to the size of his incurred loss, inﬂated by the loss
aversion coeﬃcient. Thus, in a bargaining context, incorporating the players’
loss aversion is equivalent to applying a particular transformation to the bar-
gaining problem. Reference points are subsequently endogenized by imposing
the self-supporting condition. An outcome z is said to be self-supporting under
a given solution, whenever transforming the bargaining game using outcome z
as reference point, yields a game of which the solution is z. We may interpret a
bargainer’s reference point as the expectation or the aspiration of what utility
payoﬀ that bargainer may realize given a certain bargaining solution. The self-
supporting condition then imposes that the bargaining solution assigns to each
player exactly the (initially) aspired utility level, and as a consequence, that no
losses are incurred.
The ﬁrst purpose of this article is to show that n-player bargaining games,
n ≥ 2, have exactly one outcome that is self-supporting under the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution1. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) deﬁned their solution
on two-player bargaining games. In view of Roth’s (1979) result that it is not
generally deﬁned on all n-player bargaining games, we consider the subclass
of all n-player bargaining games, deﬁned by Peters and Tijs (1984), which ex-
cludes the problematic cases. On these games we deﬁne a class of asymmetric
n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. Consider an outcome in the Pareto set
and the line segments respectively connecting that outcome to the disagreement
1This was already remarked – without proof – by Shalev (2002) for the case of two-player
bargaining games.
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point and the utopia point. For any two players we may then project these line
segments into the plane. Our solution is deﬁned by the unique outcome in
the Pareto set such that for any two players, the slopes of these projected line
segments satisfy a given proportion. We establish that for each loss aversion
proﬁle, there is a single bargaining solution in our class that yields the asso-
ciated self-supporting outcome. This implies uniqueness of a self-supporting
outcome under the Kalai-smorodinsky solution for n-player bargaining games.
Moreover, the bargaining solution we deﬁne provides an easy method of ﬁnding
this outcome.
We next provide an axiomatic characterization of this class of bargaining so-
lutions. In particular, we show that it is fully deﬁned by the standard properties
Strong Individual Rationality, Scale Invariance, and Individual Monotonicity,
and a new axiom named Proportional Concession Invariance [PCI]. The axiom
of PCI says that if players make concessions with respect to their utopia values
in such a way that the new utopia point is on the line segment connecting the
solution outcome and the original utopia point, then the solution outcome is
left unchanged.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation, and in
Section 3 we show how loss aversion is incorporated in the bargaining problem.
Section 4 describes the concept of monotonic curves, their associated bargain-
ing solutions, and deﬁnes the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution as a special case. In
Section 5 we deﬁne a class of bargaining solutions, and we show that every so-
lution in this class is the self-supporting outcome under the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution for some loss aversion proﬁle. Section 6 contains the axiomatic charac-
terization of this class of bargaining solutions. We conclude in Section 7.
All claims made in the text are proven in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
The set of players or bargainers is denoted N := {1, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 2. For
x, y ∈ RN we say x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N , and x > y if xi > yi for all
i ∈ N . The relations ‘≤’ and ‘<’ are deﬁned similarly. We deﬁne RN+ := {z ∈
R
N | z ≥ 0} and RN++ := {z ∈ R
N | z > 0}. For x, y ∈ RN we denote by xy the
vector (x1y1, . . . , xnyn), and for S ⊆ R
N we deﬁne xS := {xy ∈ RN | y ∈ S}.
Similarly, we denote (x1 + y1, . . . , xn + yn) as x+ y, and the set {x+ z | z ∈ S}
as x + S. The vector in RN that has i-th coordinate equal to 1 and all other
coordinates equal to 0 is denoted ei. The vector eM , M ⊆ N and M = ∅, has
all coordinates i ∈ M equal to 1, and all coordinates i /∈ M equal to 0. For
x ∈ RN++, we denote
(
1
x1
, . . . , 1
xn
)
as x−1.
A bargaining problem for N is deﬁned as a pair (S, d) where
• S ⊂ RN is non-empty, closed, convex, and comprehensive,
• d ∈ S,
• there exists a z ∈ S such that z > d, and
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• Sd := {z ∈ S | z ≥ d} is bounded.
A set S is comprehensive if x ∈ S and x ≥ y together imply y ∈ S. In
a bargaining context, this assumption can be interpreted as free disposal of
utility in the sense that any player can choose a lower utility payoﬀ without it
leading to an infeasible outcome. Bargainers seek agreement on an outcome z
in S where each player i ∈ N obtains utility zi. In case no agreement is reached
the disagreement outcome d results.
The set of all bargaining problems is denoted BN . For (S, d) ∈ BN and each
i ∈ N , we deﬁne
ui(S, d) := max{zi | z ∈ Sd}.
This represents the highest possible utility payoﬀ bargainer i can attain in the
bargaining problem (S, d), given that no bargainer j ∈ N , j = i, obtains a
utility payoﬀ lower than dj . The vector u(S, d) := (u1(S, d), . . . , un(S, d)) is
termed the utopia point of (S, d). For all (S, d) ∈ BN we deﬁne the Pareto set
of (S, d) as
P (S) := {z ∈ S | for all x ∈ RN if x ≥ z and x = z, then x /∈ S}.
A bargaining solution or in short, a solution, is a map ϕ : BN → RN that assigns
to any bargaining problem (S, d) ∈ BN a single point ϕ(S, d) ∈ S.
3 Bargaining with Loss Aversion
Shalev (2000, 2002) introduced a transformation that models bargainers’ loss
aversion. Each bargainer i ∈ N has a non-negative loss aversion coeﬃcient
λi and a reference point ri. We denote the vector (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ R
N
+ by λ.
Similarly, r := (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ R
N . Each bargainer i evaluates a utility payoﬀ
zi ∈ R by the transformation wi, deﬁned as
wi(zi, λi, ri) :=
{
zi if zi ≥ ri
zi − λi(ri − zi) if zi < ri.
Thus, a bargainer i who incurs a loss – i.e. obtains a utility payoﬀ zi below
his reference point ri, experiences a disutility that is equal to his loss ri − zi,
inﬂated by the loss aversion coeﬃcient λi. Payoﬀs above the reference point are
left unchanged. Note that we may also write
wi(zi, λi, ri) = (1 + λi)zi − λi max{ri, zi}.
For utility outcomes z ∈ RN we deﬁne
w(z, λ, r) := (w1(z1, λ1, r1), . . . , wn(zn, λn, rn)).
For sets T ⊂ RN we write w(T, λ, r) := {w(z, λ, r) | z ∈ T}. Henceforth,
the transformation w : RN × RN+ × R
N → RN is referred to as the Shalev
transformation.
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For bargaining problems (S, d) ∈ BN we deﬁne
w((S, d), λ, r) := (w(S, λ, r), w(d, λ, r)).
We then have the following.
Lemma 3.1 Let (S, d) ∈ BN , λ ∈ RN+ , and r ∈ R
N . Then w((S, d), λ, r) ∈ BN .
Let ϕ : BN → RN be some bargaining solution, and let (S, d) be some
problem in BN . Then by Lemma 3.1, ϕ(w(S, d), λ, r) is well-deﬁned for all
λ ∈ RN+ and r ∈ R
N . A point z ∈ S is called a self-supporting outcome under ϕ
if z = ϕ(w((S, d), λ, z)). The set of all such points is deﬁned as
Selfϕ((S, d), λ) := {z ∈ S | z = ϕ(w((S, d), λ, z))}.
Then Selfϕ : BN × RN+ → R
N is a correspondence that assigns to each bar-
gaining problem (S, d) ∈ BN and loss aversion proﬁle λ ≥ 0 a possibly empty
subset of S.
For two-player bargaining games (S, d), Shalev (2002) characterized the set
of self-supporting outcomes under the Nash bargaining solution. Speciﬁcally, he
showed that it is a closed, connected subset of the Pareto set P (S).
4 The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
Raiﬀa (1953), and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) deﬁned and characterized a
solution – the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (KS) – for bargaining problems in
B{1,2}. It was shown by Roth (1979) that the n-player extension of the KS
solution, n > 2, is not deﬁned on all bargaining problems in BN . Therefore,
Peters and Tijs (1984) introduced the rather large subclass IN of bargaining
problems in BN for which this non-existence result does not hold. Consider the
following condition.
For all x ∈ S, x ≥ d, and i ∈ N we have: (1)
x /∈ P (S) and xi < ui(S, d) ⇒ there is an ε > 0 such that x + εe
i ∈ S
Then
IN := {(S, d) ∈ BN | (S, d) satiﬁes condition (1)}.
Condition (1) says that if a feasible outcome x is not Pareto optimal, then for
any bargainer who does not get his utopia payoﬀ there is a feasible outcome
that this bargainer strictly prefers over x. The class of bargaining problems
(S, 0) ∈ IN is denoted IN0 ; for bargaining problems in I
N
0 we henceforth omit
the disagreement point, i.e. we denote (S, 0) ∈ IN0 as S.
Peters and Tijs (1984) deﬁned the n-player extension of the KS solution by
making use of monotonic curves. Speciﬁcally, a monotonic curve for N is a map
ϑ : [1, n] →
{
x ∈ Rn+ | xi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N, and 1 ≤
∑
i∈N
xi
}
,
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such that for all 1 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ n we have ϑ(s) ≤ ϑ(t) and
∑
i∈N ϑi(s) = s. The
set of all monotonic curves for N is denoted ΘN .
Lemma 4.1 (Peters and Tijs, 1984) For each ϑ ∈ ΘN and S ∈ IN0 with
u(S) = eN , the set
P (S) ∩ {ϑ(t) | t ∈ [1, n]}
contains exactly one point.
Let ϑ be some monotonic curve in ΘN . In view of Lemma 4.1 we can deﬁne
ρϑ : IN → RN , the solution associated with ϑ. Let S ∈ IN0 ; if u(S) = e
N , then{
ρϑ(S)
}
:= P (S) ∩ {ϑ(t) | t ∈ [1, n]},
and if u(S) = β, then ρϑ(S) := βρϑ(β−1S). For (S, d) ∈ IN , we deﬁne
ρϑ(S, d) := d+ρϑ(S−d). The class of all solutions associated with a monotonic
curve in ΘN is referred to as the class of individually monotonic bargaining so-
lutions. The KS solution is an element of this class. Speciﬁcally, it is deﬁned
as
ρϑˆ where ϑˆ(t) :=
teN
n
for t ∈ [1, n].
Observe that ϑˆ deﬁnes a straight line in RN , which for bargaining games S ∈ IN0
where u(S) = eN , is concurrent with the line connecting the disagreement point
0 and the utopia point eN . For general bargaining problems (S, d) ∈ IN , the
KS solution is the intersection of the Pareto set P (S) and the straight line
that connects the disagreement point d and the utopia point u(S, d). To ease
notation, we also refer to ρϑˆ as KS, i.e. KS ≡ ρϑˆ.
5 The Solution Class DN
In this section we show that self-supporting outcomes under the KS solution
are well-deﬁned, and that each game in IN has exactly one such outcome. Pe-
ters and Tijs (1984) show that I{1,2} = B{1,2}, which implies that our result
generalizes Shalev’s (2002) remark about the uniqueness of a self-supporting
outcome under the KS solution for two-player bargaining games. Furthermore,
we introduce a class DN of bargaining solutions on IN , where for any λ ∈ RN+
there is a single ϕ ∈ DN such that ϕ(S, d) is the unique self-supporting outcome
of the game (S, d) under the KS solution.
Observe that from Lemma 3.1 and the fact that the Shalev transforma-
tion preserves the ordering of payoﬀs, we obtain that (S, d) ∈ IN implies
w((S, d), λ, r) ∈ IN for all λ ∈ RN+ and r ∈ R
N . Therefore, SelfKS((S, d), λ),
the set of self-supporting outcomes under the KS solution, is well-deﬁned.
We now introduce the class DN of bargaining solutions. Denote by N¯ the
player set without player n – i.e. N¯ := N \ {n}, and deﬁne the correspondence
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Dk : IN → RN for all k ∈ RN¯++ as
Dk(S, d) := {z ∈ P (S) | for all i ∈ N¯ we have:
(un(S, d)− zn)(zi − di) = ki(ui(S, d)− zi)(zn − dn)}. (2)
It is not hard to verify that Dk = Dk
′
whenever k, k′ ∈ RN¯++ with k = k
′.
The set DN :=
{
Dk | k ∈ RN¯++
}
is deﬁned as the set that contains all such
correspondences. For any k ∈ RN¯++, deﬁne
ϑk(t) :=
{
z ∈ Gk |
n∑
i=1
zi = t
}
, (3)
where t ∈ [1, n], and Gk := {z ∈ RN+ | (1 − zn)zi = ki(1 − zi)zn for all i ∈
N¯}. In Lemma A.1, which can be found in the Appendix, we show that any
correspondence ϑk is a monotonic curve in ΘN .
Theorem 5.1 For all k ∈ RN¯++ and (S, d) ∈ I
N , we have Dk(S, d) =
{
ρϑ
k
(S, d)
}
.
It follows from Theorem 5.1 that the set DN :=
{
Dk | k ∈ RN¯++
}
is a sub-
set of the class of individually monotonic bargaining solutions. The following
theorem establishes the equivalence between {SelfKS( . , λ) | λ ∈ RN+} and D
N .
Theorem 5.2 For all (S, d) ∈ IN we have
SelfKS((S, d), λ) = Dk(S, d)
where k := (k1, . . . , kn−1), and ki :=
1+λn
1+λi
for all i ∈ N¯ . That is,
SelfKS((S, d), λ) := {z ∈ P (S) | for all i ∈ N¯ we have:
(1 + λi)(un(S, d)− zn)(zi − di) = (1 + λn)(ui(S, d)− zi)(zn − dn)}.
With a slight abuse of notation, we henceforth consider Dk(S, d) to be an
outcome. That is, if Dk(S, d) = {z}, then we write Dk(S, d) = z. Then also
Dk(S, d) =
(
Dk1 (S, d), . . . , D
k
n(S, d)
)
.
From Theorem 5.2 it follows that for each loss aversion proﬁle λ ∈ RN+ , we may
look at SelfKS( . , λ) as an asymmetric n-player Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
where the asymmetry is fully deﬁned by the bargainers’ degrees of loss aver-
sion. In the following section we provide an axiomatic characterization of these
solutions.
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6 An Axiomatic Characterization of DN
From Theorem 5.1 it follows that DN is a subclass of the individual monotonic
bargaining solutions, deﬁned and characterized by Peters and Tijs (1984). Of
their axioms we retain Scale Invariance [SI] and Individual Monotonicity [IM].
(SI) ϕ : BN → Rn satisﬁes Scale Invariance if t(ϕ(S, d)) = ϕ(t(S), t(d)), where
t : Rn → Rn is a linear transformation t(x) := α + βx, with α ∈ RN ,
β ∈ Rn++, and t(S) := α + βS for S ⊂ R
N .
(IM) ϕ : BN → Rn satisﬁes Individual Monotonicity if ϕi(S, d) ≤ ϕi(T, d) for
all (S, d), (T, d) ∈ BN and i ∈ N with S ⊆ T and uj(S) = uj(T ) for all
j ∈ N \ {i}.
The axiom of SI is consistent with the premise that bargainers’ preferences
are representable by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Kalai and
Smorodinsky (1975) introduced IM as a possible alternative to Nash’s (1950)
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives after this axiom had been criticized. A
third well-known property we require is Strong Individual Rationality [SIR].
(SIR) ϕ : BN → Rn satisﬁes Strong Individual Rationality if ϕ(S, d) > d for all
(S, d) ∈ BN .
We now introduce a novel axiom called Proportional Concession Invariance
[PCI]. One can consider a solution outcome ϕ(S, d) as a representation of con-
cessions that bargainers make with respect to their utopia point values u(S, d).
The PCI axiom then says that if we replace u(S, d) by a point uˆ on the line seg-
ment connecting ϕ(S, d) and u(S, d), and shrink the bargaining set accordingly,
then the solution outcome should not change. In other words, if the players’
utopia values are reduced in such a way that their concessions with respect to
the original solution outcome change proportionally, then this solution outcome
should not change.
(PCI) ϕ : BN → Rn satisﬁes Proportional Concession Invariance if for a bargain-
ing problem (S, d) ∈ BN with solution ϕ(S, d), and a bargaining problem
(Sˆ, d) with
Sˆ := {z ∈ S | z ≤ uˆ},
where uˆ = αϕ(S, d)+ (1−α)u(S, d) for some α ∈ [0, 1], we have ϕ(Sˆ, d) =
ϕ(S, d).
The property PCI can also be thought of as a very weak form of IIA, and
is therefore satisﬁed by the Nash bargaining solution and its asymmetric vari-
ants. Furthermore, observe that PCI is the counterpart to Disagreement Point
Convexity [DPC], one of the axioms used by Peters and van Damme (1991) to
characterize the class of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions. This property
requires that the solution outcome ϕ(S, d) remain unchanged if we replace d
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by a point dˆ on the line segment connecting the disagreement point d and the
solution outcome ϕ(S, d).
It is worth noting that the characterization of DN makes no use of Pareto
Optimality [PO]. In fact, in the Appendix, we use an argument similar as in
Roth (1977) to show that PO is implied by our axioms. The following theorem
states our characterization result.
Theorem 6.1 Let ϕ : IN → RN be a bargaining solution. Then ϕ ∈ DN if and
only if ϕ satisﬁes SIR, SI, IM, and PCI.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have established that bargaining games with n possibly loss averse players,
n ≥ 2, have exactly one self-supporting outcome under the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution. Moreover, we deﬁned an asymmetric n-player version of the KS so-
lution which directly captures the asymmetry resulting from the bargainers’
degrees of loss aversion. We may summarize these results in the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 7.1 Let λ ∈ RN+ be the proﬁle of loss aversion. For every (S, d) ∈
IN , an outcome z ∈ S is self-supporting under the KS solution if and only if
z = Dk(S, d), where ki :=
1+λn
1+λi
for all i ∈ N¯ .
We have characterized the class DN of all bargaining solutions Dk by the
axioms of Strong Individual Rationality, Scale Invariance, Individual Monotonic-
ity, and Proportional Concession Invariance. While the ﬁrst three properties
are standard in the axiomatic bargining literature, the last one is newly deﬁned
in this article.
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A Collected Proofs
In this appendix we prove the claims made in the article.
A.1 The proof of Lemma 3.1
Let (S, d) ∈ BN , λ ∈ RN+ , and r ∈ R
N . Since the Shalev transformation is
continuous, one-to-one, and preserves the ordering of payoﬀs, we have that
• w(S, λ, r) is non-empty, closed, and comprehensive,
• w(d, λ, r) ∈ w(S, λ, r),
• there are z ∈ w(S, λ, r) with z > w(d, λ, r), and
• w(Sd, λ, r) is bounded.
Left to show is that w(S, λ, r) is convex. Let x, y ∈ S and t ∈ [0, 1]. By
convexity of S, we have tx + (1− t)y ∈ S. By the fact that w is concave in the
ﬁrst coordinate, we have
w(tx + (1− t)y, λ, r) ≥ tw(x, λ, r) + (1− t)w(y, λ, r).
By comprehensiveness of w(S, λ, r) this implies
tw(x, λ, r) + (1− t)w(y, λ, r) ∈ w(S, λ, r).
This implies convexity of w(S, λ, r).
A.2 The proof of Theorem 5.1
First, we show the following.
Lemma A.1 Let k ∈ RN¯++. Then the correspondence ϑ
k(t), t ∈ [1, n], is a
monotonic curve.
Proof. Let s¯ ∈ [1, n]. We show that there is a unique point z∗ ∈ RN+ such
that ϑk(s¯) = z∗. That is, we show that the system of equations
(1− zn)zi = ki(1− zi)zn for all i ∈ N¯ (4)
n∑
j=1
zj = s¯, (5)
has exactly one solution z∗ in RN+ . Suppose the system has a solution z ∈ R
N
+ ,
and suppose zn > 1. Then for each i ∈ N¯ we either have zi > 1 or zi < 0, which
by z ∈ RN+ implies zi > 1 for all i ∈ N . Since this is a violation of (5), we must
have zn ≤ 1. Since (1− ki)
−1 /∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N¯ , we can write
zi =
kizn
1− zn(1− ki)
for all i ∈ N¯ .
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Then for all i ∈ N¯ , zi is strictly increasing in zn on the domain [0, 1]. The
observations that
n∑
j=1
zj = 0 ≤ s¯ for zn = 0, and
n∑
j=1
zj = n ≥ s¯ for zn = 1,
together with continuity of
∑n
j=1 zj in zn then imply that there is exactly one
z∗ ∈ RN+ that solves the system of equations (4) and (5). It follows that the
correspondence ϑk is a map. Moreover, for all 1 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ n we have 0 <
ϑk(s) ≤ ϑk(t) ≤ eN and
∑
i∈N ϑ
k
i (s) = s. It follows that ϑ
k is a monotonic
curve.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we show that each map Dk ∈ DN is the bargaining
solution associated with the monotonic curve ϑk as deﬁned in (3).
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Consider a normalized bargaining problem T ∈ IN0 ,
i.e. u(T ) = eN . Let k ∈ RN¯++ and observe that by (2) we have
Dk(T ) = P (T ) ∩Gk.
By convexity of T we have P (T ) ⊂ {z ∈ RN+ |
∑
j∈N zj ≥ 1}, implying
Dk(T ) = P (T ) ∩ {ϑk(t) | t ∈ [1, n]},
where ϑk is deﬁned by (3). It follows that Dk(T ) =
{
ρϑ
k
(T )
}
. From this it is
easily established that
Dk(S, d) =
{
ρϑ
k
(S, d)
}
for all (S, d) ∈ IN .
A.3 The Proof of Theorem 5.2
We start with the following lemma.
Lemma A.2 Let (S, d) ∈ IN . Then Dk(S, d) = KS(S, d) if and only if k = eN¯ .
Proof. It is easy to show that for any t ∈ [1, n), we have ϑk(t) = ϑˆ(t) if and
only if k = eN¯ . The result then follows from Theorem 5.1 and the deﬁnition of
KS.
Proof of Theorem 5.2 Let (S, d) ∈ IN and λ ∈ RN+ , and let u ≡ u(S, d). By
Lemma A.2 and the fact that KS(S, d) ≥ d, we have
KS(w((S, d), λ, z)) = {x ∈ P (w(S, λ, z)) | for all i ∈ N¯ we have
(un − xn)(xi − (1 + λi)di + λizi) = (ui − xi)(xn − (1 + λn)dn + λnzn)}.
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Observe that z ∈ SelfKS((S, d), λ) if and only if z = KS(w((S, d), λ, z)). That
is, z ∈ SelfKS((S, d), λ) iﬀ
(i) z ∈ P (w(S, λ, z)), and
(ii) (un − zn)(zi − (1 + λi)di + λizi) = (ui − zi)(zn − (1 + λn)dn + λnzn) for
all i ∈ N¯ .
From z = w(z, λ, z), P (w(S, λ, z)) = w(P (S), λ, z), and the fact that the Shalev
transformation is one-to-one, it follows that z ∈ P (w(S, λ, z)) is equivalent to
z ∈ P (S).
Deﬁne k := (k1, . . . , kn−1) where ki :=
1+λn
1+λi
for all i ∈ N¯ . Observe that the
statement in (ii) is equivalent to
(un − zn)(zi − di) = ki(ui − zi)(zn − dn) for all i ∈ N¯ .
It follows that z ∈ SelfKS((S, d), λ) is equivalent to
z ∈
{
x ∈ P (S) | (un − xn)(xi − di) = ki(ui − xi)(xn − dn) for all i ∈ N¯
}
.
Hence, SelfKS((S, d), λ) = Dk(S, d).
A.4 The proof of Theorem 6.1
The standard axiom of Pareto Optimality is useful for the proof.
(PO) ϕ : BN → RN satisﬁes PO if ϕ(S, d) ∈ P (S) for all (S, d) ∈ BN .
From Peters and Tijs (1984) we obtain the following.
Lemma A.3 (Peters and Tijs, 1984) Let ϕ : IN → RN be a bargaining
solution. Then ϕ satisﬁes PO, SI, and IM, if and only if ϕ = ρϑ for some
ϑ ∈ ΘN .
This we use to establish the following result.
Proposition A.4 Let ϕ : IN → RN be a bargaining solution in DN . Then ϕ
satisﬁes SIR, SI, IM, and PCI.
Proof. Since ϕ ∈ DN we have ϕ = Dk for some k ∈ RN¯++. By Theorem 5.1,
we have ϕ = ρϑ where ϑ ∈ ΘN , which by Lemma A.3 implies that ϕ satisﬁes SI
and IM.
Consider a bargaining problem (S, d) ∈ IN , and the solution ϕ(S, d) =: z. To
see that ϕ satisﬁes SIR, suppose there is an i ∈ N such that zi = di. Observe
that z ∈ P (S) and
(un(S, d)− zn)(zj − dj) = kj(uj(S, d)− zj)(zn − dn) for all j ∈ N¯ .
If i = n, then zj = dj for all j ∈ N¯ , implying z = d. Let i ∈ N¯ , and observe
that zi = di implies zn = dn, and thus z = d. Since d /∈ P (S), we arrive at a
contradiction. It follows that z > d.
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To see that ϕ satisﬁes PCI, consider the problem (Sˆ, d) ∈ IN where
Sˆ := {x ∈ S | x ≤ uˆ},
with uˆ = αz+(1−α)u(S, d) for some α ∈ (0, 1). Then uˆ−z = (1−α)(u(S, d)−z),
implying that
(uˆn − zn)(zi − di) = ki(uˆi − zi)(zn − dn) for all i ∈ N¯ . (6)
Since z ∈ Sˆ and z ∈ P (S), we have z ∈ P (Sˆ). This and (6) together imply
Dk(Sˆ, d) = z. Hence, ϕ satisﬁes PCI.
For the reverse implication we require two additional lemmas.
Lemma A.5 Let (S, d) ∈ IN , and z ∈ S \ P (S). Then for the function f :
[0, 1] → RN deﬁned as
f(α) := (1− α)z + αu(S, d),
there is exactly one α∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that f(α∗) ∈ P (S).
Proof. By compactness of S we have that
α∗ := max{α | f(α) ∈ S}
is well-deﬁned. We now show that f(α∗) ∈ P (S). Suppose f(α∗) /∈ P (S). By
condition (1), it follows that for each i ∈ N with zi < ui(S, d), there is an εi > 0
such that f(α∗)+ εie
i ∈ S. Then by convexity of S there is an ε > 0, such that
f(α∗) + ε(u(S, d)− z) ∈ S.
But then there is a β > α∗ with f(β) ∈ S. This is a contradiction.
To show uniqueness, let α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] with α1 = α2, and suppose f(α1), f(α2) ∈
P (S). Without loss of generality, assume α2 > α1. Then since u(S, d) ≥ z and
u(S, d) = z, we have f(α2) ≥ f(α1) and f(α2) = f(α1). Since f(α1) ∈ P (S),
this implies f(α2) /∈ S, a contradiction.
Lemma A.6 Let ϕ : IN → RN be a solution satisfying SIR, SI, and PCI. Then
ϕ satisﬁes PO.
Proof. Let ϕ : IN → RN be a bargaining solution satisfying SIR, SI, and
PCI. By SI it is suﬃcient to restrict attention to bargaining problems in IN0 .
Let S ∈ IN0 . By SIR we have ϕ(S) > 0. Now assume ϕ(S) /∈ P (S). By Lemma
A.5, there is a single z∗ ∈ P (S), such that
z∗ = (1− α)ϕ(S) + αu(S) for some α ∈ (0, 1].
Deﬁne Sˆ := {x ∈ S | x ≤ z∗}, and observe that by PCI we have
ϕ(Sˆ) = ϕ(S).
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Similarly, for the set T := {x ∈ S | x ≤ ϕ(S)} we have ϕ(T ) = ϕ(S). Now
observe that Sˆ = [z∗(ϕ(S))−1]T . Then by SI we have
ϕ(Sˆ) = z∗(ϕ(S))−1ϕ(T ) = z∗(ϕ(S))−1ϕ(S) = z∗.
This contradicts ϕ(Sˆ) = ϕ(S).
Proposition A.7 Let ϕ : IN → RN be a bargaining solution satisfying SIR,
SI, IM, and PCI. Then ϕ ∈ DN .
Proof. Since ϕ satisﬁes SIR, SI, and PCI, it follows from Lemma A.6 that ϕ
satisﬁes PO. Then by Lemma A.3 it follows that ϕ ≡ ρϑ
∗
for some monotonic
curve ϑ∗ ∈ ΘN .
Consider the problem
H := Conv
(
{ei | i ∈ N} ∪ {0}
)
,
and observe that H ∈ IN0 . If there is an i ∈ N with ϕi(H) = 1, then ϕj(H) = 0
for all j = i, which is a violation SIR. Hence, 0 < ϕ(H) < eN . Hence, k :=
(k1, . . . , kn−1), where
ki :=
1− ϕn(H)
1− ϕi(H)
·
ϕi(H)
ϕn(H)
, (7)
is well-deﬁned and k ∈ RN¯++.
In what follows, we show that
ϑ∗(t) = ϑk(t) (8)
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n. We do this in three steps. Let t¯ ∈ [1, n]. Then
1. we construct a speciﬁc problem S ∈ IN0 ,
2. we show that ϕ(S) = ϑk(t¯), and
3. we show that ϕ(S) = ϑ∗(t¯).
By (8) we have ρϑ
k
= ρϑ
∗
, which together with ϕ = ρϑ
∗
and Dk = ρϑ
k
estab-
lishes ϕ = Dk.
Step 1: Deﬁne the function g : [0, 1] → [1, n] as
g(α) :=
∑
i∈N
ϕi(H)
αϕi(H) + (1− α)
. (9)
From the fact that g is strictly increasing2 and continuous, and the fact that
g(0) = 1 and g(1) = n, it follows that for each t ∈ [1, n] there is a unique
α ∈ [0, 1] such that g(α) = t.
2This follows from ϕ(H) = 0 and ϕ(H) = eN .
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Let β := α¯ϕ(H) + (1 − α¯)eN , where α¯ is such that g(α¯) = t¯. Then deﬁne the
problem S ∈ IN0 as
S := {β−1z | z ∈ H and z ≤ β}.
Since ϕ satisﬁes SI and PCI, we have
ϕ(S) = β−1ϕ(H). (10)
It follows from (10) and (9), and the fact that g(α¯) = t¯ that
∑
i∈N ϕi(S) = t¯.
Step 2: Rewriting (7) yields
(1− ϕn(H))ϕi(H) = ki(1− ϕi(H))ϕn(H) for all i ∈ N¯ .
From the deﬁnition of β we have β − ϕ(H) = (1− α¯)(eN − ϕ(H)). Thus,
(βn − ϕn(H))ϕi(H) = ki(βi − ϕi(H))ϕn(H) for all i ∈ N¯ .
For each i ∈ N¯ , we can multiply both sides of the equation by 1
βnβi
. By (10)
this yields
(1− ϕn(S))ϕi(S) = ki(1− ϕi(S))ϕn(S) for all i ∈ N¯ .
It follows that ϕ(S) ∈ Gk. Since
∑
i∈N ϕi(S) = t¯, we have
ϕ(S) = ϑk(t¯). (11)
Step 3: Since ϕ ≡ ρϑ
∗
, and S ∈ IN0 with u(S) = e
N , we have
{ϕ(S)} = P (S) ∩ {ϑ∗(t) | t ∈ [1, n]},
which implies ϕ(S) = ϑ∗(t∗) for some t∗ ∈ [1, n]. From the deﬁnition of mono-
tonic curves we obtain
t∗ =
∑
i∈N
ϑ∗i (t
∗) =
∑
i∈N
ϕi(S) = t¯.
Hence,
ϕ(S) = ϑ∗(t¯). (12)
Combining (11) and (12) yields the desired result.
Theorem 6.1 is then established by Propositions A.4 and A.7.
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